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Raising the rate of domestic savings and using the funds more
efficiently for development purposes is one of the policy prio-
rities of the present Peruvian government (INP, 1986). Gross
domestic savings as a percentage of gross domestic product have
fallen dramatically from a peak of 21,2 per cent in 1979 to 10.1
per cent in 1984 (Table 1) . The domestic savings rate has been
insufficient for a satisfactory level of real output growth.
While in the seventies Peru could draw on foreign savings to
finance domestic development the access to international capital
markets is rather limited since 1982. The availability of foreign
credit will also be restricted in the near future last not least
as a consequence of the unilateral declaration of the new govern-
ment in July 1985 to limit Peru's payments on its US-$ 14 billion-
foreign debt to the equivalent of 10 per cent of its export earn-
ings . Hence, Peru will have to rely mainly on domestic resources
in order to finance economic development.
This paper focusses on the reasons of the poor performance of
domestic resource mobilization in Peru. It begins with an analy-
sis of the structure of domestic savings and its changes in the
course of economic development (Section II) . After the descrip-
tion of the Peruvian financial sector (Section III) financial
policies since the early 1970 are reviewed and the effects of
financial repression discussed (Section IV). Finally some policy
suggestions to improve domestic resource mobilization are pre-
sented.
This study is part of a research project on savings mobiliza-
tion in developing countries and was carried out with financial
support from the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung. The author has bene-
fited from helpful comments provided by Ulrich Hiemenz.
If compared with Latin American's biggest debtor - Brazil -
Peru's foreign debt per capita ratio is similar (711 US-$ and
US-$ 749, respectively). However, Brazil's debt service ac-
counted in 1985 to more than 40 per cent of the country's ex-




























































































































































































































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1986, Washington. - INE, Cuentas Nacionales 1950-1982, Lima
1983. - International Currency Review (1986). - Nasser (1985). - Own calculations.- 3 -
II. Economic Development and Domestic Savings
At the beginning of the seventies the Peruvian economy has exper-
ienced relatively high rates of economic growth (Table 1). Gross
domestic product grew on the average at 4.5 per cent in real
terms (1970-75). However, economic growth slowed down dramati-
cally in the period 1976-1980 to 1.7 per cent and was even nega-
tive on average in 1981-1985 (-2.6 per cent). Faced with sus-
tained population growth, the deteriorating economic situation
lead to a serious reduction of real per capita income with an
average yearly variation (compounded) of -2.0 per cent in the
period 1975-1985. At the same time inflation was accelerating
from 19 per cent on average in the period 1970-1974 to more than
100 per cent since 1983. Although the Peruvian economy was not
hit by the oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979 as severely as many
other developing countries - mainly due to own oil reserves T the
inward looking development strategy not only lead to heavy dis-
tortions in domestic markets but was also accompanied by a rising
foreign debt which accrued up to 12 billions US-$ at the end of
1983. Due to the poor export performance it became more and more
difficult to service the accumulated debt.
High inflation rates and sustained economic recession have hea-
vily impeded domestic capital formation. The share of domestic
savings in gross domestic product fell dramatically in the last
25 years, namely from 22.3 per cent at the beginning of the six-
ties (1960-62) to less than 12 per cent in the early eighties
(Table 2). While the share of business savings to gross domestic
product remained roughly constant between 196 0 and 1984 (11-13
per cent) the relative share of (voluntary) private household
savings fell dramatically from about 9 per cent at the beginning
of the sixties to less than 1 per cent in the period 1971-1974
and has even been negative in the early eighties (1980-1982). The
level of total gross savings was increasing to 19 per cent in the
early eighties (after a heavy decline in the seventies) only due- 4 -
Table 2 - Level and Structure of Savings, Peru 1970-1984



























































































Source: Thorne (1984 and 1986) .- 5 -
to substantial inflow of foreign savings. The bulk of domestic
savings is presently being generated by private enterprises (more
than 90 per cent) while private households and public enterprises
do barely contribute to domestic savings or are even deficit
units. In addition, government savings have been negative in the
last years (1983-84: -3.3 per cent).
Several reasons can be put forward to explain the decline of
private household savings and the high shares of business sav-
ings, which all are directly or indirectly related to the esca-
lation of inflation. With increasing inflation rates private
households spend a larger share of their disposable income for
durable consumer goods which are for most of the families the
only available inflation hedges in the absence of attractive real
returns on financial assets. Besides, especially the poorer parts
of the population have to spend increasing shares of their income
for education, house building and family help. These expenditures
are captured in the statistics as consumption but are actually
more or less substitutes for savings if the provision motive is
put into focus. The decline of private household savings under
conditions of high inflation is substantiated by the attitude of
dividend earners which find it safer and more profitable to ac-
cumulate their earnings in the enterprises than to save as indi-
viduals.
Enterprises on the other hand tend to rely more and more on self-
financing when sustained inflationary processes occur . This is
especially true for those enterprises with no access to the bank-
ing system which can only realise long-term investment after
having accumulated financial resources internally. In addition,
the need to provide credit to their suppliers can also favour
this trend. Other factors like a low rentability of financial
assets, a discriminating tax policy, and unstable political con-
ditions may also enhance internal capital accumulation.
This statement is supported empirically by an analysis of the
structure of private business savings in the inflationary con-
text of the Argentine economy (Cavallo, Petrei, 1983).—' 6 —
The poor savings performance of the public sector can have its
origin in the easy access to international credits which may
favour expenditures in current consumption. Furthermore, as far
as the public sector receives preferential credit from the do-
mestic financial market at subsidized interest rates this not
only discriminates the saver, who earns unattractive yields from
its savings deposits but also discourages the private investor
who is crowded out in the credit rationing process.
Whether this pattern of arguments is of relevance for the drastic
decline of Peru's domestic savings will be examined more detailed
in the following chapters. Since the Peruvian financial sector
was obviously unable to intermediate efficiently between savers
and investors the analysis focusses on the performance of the
financial sector under conditions of high inflation.
III. The Financial System in Peru
The Peruvian financial system consists of a complex institutional
framework with the Central Reserve Bank as a monopolistic sup-
plier of high powered money, the banks and non-financial institu-
tions acting as intermediaries between savers and lenders, and a
stock market.
The Central Reserve Bank's activities are restricted almost ex-
clusively to transactions with the rest of the financial system,
the treasury and foreign institutions. In 1983, coins and bank-
notes in circulation (non-financial sector) represented about 22
per cent of total liabilities of the Peruvian financial system
(Table 3) . Direct claims in the non-financial sector are prin-
cipally to the public sector, representing 22 per cent of total
This is a rather high figure if compared with the ratio in
Japan (4.1. per cent), the Federal Republic of Germany (8.1 per
cent) and Italy (8.1. per cent) for the same year.Table 3 - Shares of Liabilities and Claims of Different Financial Institutions to the Non-Financial
Sector
a, Peru 1965-1983 (per cent)
Institutions
Central Bank
Banco Central de Reserva del Peru
Deposit-taking institutions









































































































































































Liabilities to the public and private sector. It includes in national currency, demand deposits, time
deposits, saving deposits and bank securities, and deposits in foreign currency. Excluded are capital
liabilities, profits and capital reserves. - Deposits and other liabilities. - Loans and other claims.
Mainly currency. - Liabilities to the public sector are the most significant.
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Peru.- 8 -
claims of the financial system (principally government securi-
ties) . The Central Reserve Bank is also concerned with foreign
currency control operations, the regulation and determination of
interest rates and the credit regulation by designing reserve
ratios and the amount of rediscount facilities which are avail-
able to banks. However, in reality the Central Reserve Bank ra-
ther acts as an administrative body while the decision making
unit is more or less the monetary council where the ministry of
finance has paramount influence.
Among the category of deposit institutions with principally
short-term operations the Bank of the Nation (Banco de la Nacion)
has a special status. It is primarily concerned with the working
capital needs of the central government, the public enterprises
and other public institutions and is virtually alone in receiving
the deposits of the public sector. In 1983, the Bank of the Na-
tion had a 15 per cent share of the deposits and other liabi-
lities of the financial system and a 14 per cent share of claims,
principally in the public sector.
Commercial banks have a predominant place in the Peruvian finan-
cial system. With a total of 800 offices, the 11 commercial
banks have approximately 50 per cent of all branches and offices
of financial institutions. Of these, 59 per cent are located at
Lima and 41 per cent in the rest of the economy. Commercial banks
play an important role in mobilizing financial resources. In 1983
more than 50 per cent of total liabilities in the financial sys-
tem were within the commercial banks. An important feature of the
commercial banks is that in 1983 deposits in foreign currency
represented 56 per cent of all their liabilities (Table Al) .
Their claims are principally on the private sector. The commer-
cial banking sector is highly concentrated. The privately owned
Four of the 11 commercial banks are private, four foreign (al-
lowed to accept checking but not savings deposits) and three
"associated" which operate under the same regulations as the
other commercial banks but which are prohibited from dealing in
maturities of over one year.- 9 -
Banco de Credito alone accounts for about 50 per cent of the
liabilities and claims of the commercial banks while the three
state-owned banks (Banco Asociada) have a share of approximately
30 per cent (Cebrecos Revilla, 1986) .
There are five development banks in Peru, with about 160 branches
and offices. Credit transactions are conducted mainly with the
private sector meeting working capital and investment financing
requirements. Although development banks are authorized to pro-
vide banking facilities their performance, especially in attract-
ing deposits, has been very poor. The major sources of funds are
government transfers, lines of promotional credit and funds from
international development institutions. This is also true for
another state-owned development institution, the Corporacion
Financiera de Desarrollo (COFIDE), which has a 25 per cent share
of the investments and other claims of this type of institutions.
Peru's credit cooperatives are with about 1.6 million members the
most important part of the national cooperative movement. Most of
the members belong to the low or middle income earners. 2 69 of
the 421 credit cooperatives which can be found in all parts of
the country are members of the Central Credit Cooperative (CCC)
which has 33 branches. At the end of 1982 the paid in capital for
the base cooperatives was estimated to be 51 millions US-$, that
of the central 0.5 million US-$ (Marion, 1983).
The most serious problem of the Peruvian credit cooperatives is a
dramatic decapitalization of their wealth in the last decade. The
growth of cooperatives' shares and savings deposits from the
members was more or less eaten up by the increase of the infla-
tion rate. It was estimated that between 1975 and 1982 the real
value of total cooperative savings decreased more than 80 per
cent. The share of savings mobilized through credit cooperatives
to total financial savings in 1980 was about 50 per cent lower
(8.9 per cent) than 1975 (17.9 per cent) .
For a discussion of the main reasons for this dramatic decline
see Burkett (1986) and Fischer (1986, p. 399 f.).- 10 -
The Peruvian stock market is a relatively unimportant complement
to the system of financial intermediaries described above. Acti-
vity in the market is limited to common stocks of about 100 large
companies, labor shares in about 90 of these, a few bonds (the
most important of which are issued by COFIDE), and, mortgage
certificates of the Central Mortgage Bank. While market activity
grew quite rapidly from 1975 until 1980, since then the slow-down
in the export sector and the economy in general has depressed the
market. However, even during its peak periods the stock market
has not been an important element in raising new capital; since
1975 new issues have accounted for less than 0.1 per cent of
total gross investment (Cebrecos Revilla, 1986).
Contractual savings consist principally of the compulsory con-
tributions to the social security system. The functions of the
social security institute range from the provision of health
services to the administration of a pension fund. A large portion
of the institute's resources is government oriented.
The share of the informal sector (or parallel market) to total
economic activities in Peru is estimated to be more than 50 per
cent (Susano, 1983). Because access to the credits of financial
institutions is limited, especially for the one-person indepen-
dent firm in the commercial, services and transport sector a
considerable proportion of the self employed labour force as well
as small enterprises resort to the informal markets. There inter-
est rates varied between 250 and 500 per cent against about 140
per cent which was the effective annual rate of the formal sector
in 1984 (Susano, 1984).
The stock market's relatively minor role has been explained by
the following four factors (World Bank, 1983, p. 61): the avai-
lability of cheap credit during the seventies, desires by Peru-
vian businessmen to retain control of their firms, double taxa-
tion of dividends versus a lack of taxation on interest and
reinvested profits, and, difficulties in setting up legal con-
ditions for stock registration that are attractive to both
firms and potential stockholders.- 11 -
The normal financing practice in the informal market can be cha-
racterized by the extension of credit by suppliers (manufacturer
or wholesale distributors) in the formal sector which consign
finished products, input and work equipment to small manufactur-
ers or independent businessmen. It was estimated, that about 60
per cent of the enterprises in the informal sector ordered such
products from establishments in the formal sector and that the
resources supplied amounted to $ 3,114 million for the mid of
1983 which was almost equivalent to the credit of $ 3,250 million
provided by the institutional financial sector to the private
sector (Susano, 1984). However, only an average of 2 per cent of
the informal productive units received funds from the institu-
tional financial sector in 1982 (Cebrecos Revilla, 1986, p. 69).
Another widespread type of financing is in the informal market
the "junta" or "pandero", which is especially prevalent in the
outskirts of cities and in public or private offices. Involving
monthly up to 50 persons who'contribute periodically (weekly or
monthly) an amount and receive their contributions in a single
lottery drawing. These funds are generally used to finance con-
sumption, to repay debt or to initiate activities in the informal
sector. Other forms of financing consist of loans between funds
and family members. Usurers and pawn brokers are also found in
these informal circuits.
IV. Financial Policies and the Effects of Financial Repression
1. Financial Policies in the Period 1970 - 1984
Throughout the 1970 to 1977 period the Peruvian government inter-
vened heavily into the financial system . Important components of
this system were a regime of detailed interest ceilings and
selective credit policies realized with an array of publicly
owned, specialized institutions. The goal of these interventions
For a detailed description of financial policies in this period
see Banco Central de Reserva del Peru (1984).- 12 -
was to achieve a wide range of policy objectives, controlling
both the allocation and cost of credit. A large percentage of the
credits thus was channeled to target borrowers, such as agricul-
ture, housing, and public enterprises mainly via extensive redis-
counting of loans provided by the specialized financial institu-
tions and to a lesser extent via preferential rediscounting of
commercial bank lending to targetted sectors and restrictions on
the composition of the bank portfolios.
The dominant role the Peruvian government has played in the coun-
try's financial system was partly reduced in the period 1978-1982
when a number of reforms were introduced, aimed at controlling
inflation and ending economic stagnation by giving market forces
a larger role in the economy. These reforms included steps to-
wards the liberalization of interest rate policies, the easing of
reserve requirements, the opening of capital markets and the
legalization of dollar denominated financial transactions. Be-
ginning in late 1978, a series of large upward shifts were made
in the nominal interest rate ceilings and the permissible com-
pounding periods were also progressively shortened starting in
1981. In early 1982, the government adopted a uniform 55 per cent
nominal interest rate ceiling on all soles denominated deposits
(Table 4). By varying the length of the compounding period, the
banks were able to pay effective rates higher than the nominal
ceilings and to provide some differential between different types
2
of deposits . Dollar deposits were not subject to ceilings, but
were paid roughly three percentage below LIBOR, in dollar. Thus
the expected yield on dollar asset, in soles terms, depended on
the expected rate of devaluation.
1 This ceiling also included demand deposits, although the rate
actually paid on these accounts was typically 10 per cent, and
ranged up to 20 per cent on large accounts.
2
Term deposits and mortgage certificates were compounded quar-
terly and savings deposits were not compounded.B i b I i o t h e k
InstihitsfGrWeltwirtschafr - 13 -
Despite of the reform measures the inflation rate continued to
accelerate. The main reason for this has been the necessity of
increased inflationary financing to cover the rising government
deficit . In addition the rate of inflation was increased by the
capital market reforms themselves. Cutting the required reserves
and paying interests on them as well as allowing the dollariza-
tion of the economy reduced the demand for financial assets do-
minated in and thus the demand for the base money. This decrease
reduced dramatically the base of the inflation tax and thus the
receipts from the inflation tax necessary to finance the rising
government deficit could only be maintained by increasing infla-
tion rates. The conflict between rising inflation and capital
market reform in Peru clearly demonstrates the difficulties that
can arise when financial sector liberalization occurs before the
fiscal deficit is under control^.
The rise of domestic inflation in the seventies and especially
the escalation of inflation in the 1980s to levels exceeding 100
per cent led to persisting negative real rates of interest on
soles deposits (Table 4). At the same time foreign currency depo-
sits yielded positive real returns thus representing a readily
available and highly liquid inflation hedge. Hence, with the
escalation of inflation there has occured an increasing flight
away from soles deposits towards foreign currency deposits. The
ratio of soles money to income has been steadily falling while
2
the foreign money to income ratio has been rising (Table 5) .By
the end of 1984 the real value of dollar denominated deposits was
For the empirical evidence of a statistically significant rela-
tionship between the inflation rate, money growth and the bud-
get deficit in Peru see Nasser (1985) .
o
Corsepius (1986) found a correlation coefficient of -0.8 (0.8)
between the inflation rate and soles deposits (foreign currency
deposits).- 14 -
Table 4 - Nominal and Real Interest Rates for Bank Deposits as well as
Expected Rates of Inflation and Devaluation, 1970 - 1984






















































































aEffective; december. - Ex post; related to changes of the consumer
price index in the last six months. - Ex ante; related to changes of the
consumer price index six months later. - Domestic currency via US-$; ex
ante, related to the exchange rate six months later; december.
Source: Hanson, Neal (1984) ; Banco Central de Reserva del Peru; Own cal-
culations .- 15 -
Table 5 - Structure of the Liabilities of the Consolidated Banking System to the




































































































Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Peru; Own calculations.
larger than the real value of the broad definition (M2) of the
soles money stock.
As of late 1982, the government set effective interest rate ceil-
ings quite high relative to past inflation rates. However, ex
post, the yields on soles denominated assets remained well below
the ex post yields on dollar assets and "dollarization" steadily
increased (Table 5). In an attempt to capture some of these dol-
lar resources, the government imposed a 90-100 per cent reserve
requirement on the banks dollar deposits. The Central Reserve
Bank invested these dollars overseas at a yield equal to LIBOR,
paying the banks approximately two percentage points below LIBOR
which payed depositors about LIBOR minus three percentage points.- 16 -
2. The Effects of Financial Repression
The main instrument of regulating the financial sector in the
period since 1970 has been ceilings on interest rates which
yielded in the presence of high inflation in strongly negative
real interest rates on soles deposits and credits thus indicating
heavy financial repression . The continuing erosion of the pur-
chasing power of money represented a massive tax on currency
holdings and on demand deposits. Because of the high opportunity
costs of holding money, Ml in per cent of GDP the ratio declined
from a peak of 23.0 per cent in 3 974 to some 12 per cent in 1984
(Table 1). This demonetization implies a loss in overall economic
wealth because of the services of money forgone.
At the same time, the ability of the financial sector to mobilize
domestic savings to finance soles credits has been reduced by the
maintainance of negative real rates of interest. By legalizing
dollar transactions and maintaining high reserve requirements,
the government established some control over funds that would
i
have leaked out in illegal capital flight. Although these dollar
deposits protected savers from purchasing power losses and helped
to maintain a relatively stable financial asset (M2) to GDP ra-
2
tio this policy did not increase the domestic credit supply and
was highly destabilizing through the loss of control for the
monetary authority. By maintaining high reserve requirements on
foreign currency deposits those funds were invested overseas and
thus not available domestically. Hence the process was essen-
tially capital flight through the Central Reserve Bank. With
surging inflation and lagging devaluation the "dollarization" was
bound to escalate.
For an overview of the theoretical and empirical studies on
financial repression in developing countries see Fischer
(1982), Fry (1982) and Gupta (1984).
2
However, compared to countries like India and Sri Lanka, which
in per capita-income terms rank below Peru, the M2 to GDP ratio
in Peru reached a very low level in 1984 (Appendix Table A2).- 17 -
Besides reducing available credit, the shift into dollar assets
shrinked the size of the domestic monetary base which reduced the
quantity of assets that the government could tax through seignor-
age. This loss probably produced the explosive increase in infla-
tion by the following mechanism: The decrease in the domestic
monetary base reduces the government's yield from seignorage and
increases the need for financing the increasing deficit . A lar-
ger need for financing implies more inflationary finance and more
rapid inflation. Faster domestic inflation, relative to foreign
inflation, raises the rate of devaluation required to maintain
the real exchange rate. Both more rapid inflation or an increas-
ingly misaligned currency raises the expected soles return on
dollar assets. Higher expected returns on dollar assets promote
the dollarization which further shrinks the domestic monetarv
base, this reinforcing the inflationary process'.
Because of the marked decline of the supply of soles deposits (in
real terms) and large-scale public sector borrowing the volume of
credit available for the private sector shrank over the last
decade. Demand for credit, however, exceeded supply by a substan-
tial amount given negative real interest rates. In fact, negative
real interest rates imply a heavy subsidization of lenders at the
expense of the holders of financial assets. Therefore, credits
had to be rationed by the Central Reserve Bank or in an informal
way. This means, that the allocation of credit was not governed
by efficiency criteria but by factors such as lobbyist activi-
ties, the existence of interlocking ownership between companies
and banks or the possibility of mobilizing government support.
Finally, the expansion of informal credit markets is the logical
result of the non-availability of credits due to the heavy regu-
lations of the organized financial sector.
This process can even occur even with a given deficit.
2
See Fischer and Trapp (1986) for a related discussion in the
context of Argentina's hyperinflation.- 18 -
Low interest rate ceilings, selective credit policies and high
reserve requirements on dollar deposits have also failed to
create the conditions for efficiency and competition in the bank-
ing sector. Lack of competition and a limitation on the inter-
sectoral mobility of financial resources together with a lack of
economies of scale and high labor costs contributed to excessive
intermediation costs which are high even by developing country
standards (see next section). The financial infrastructure itself
seems not to be a basic impediment for increased efforts in mobi-
lizing financial savings or providing credits . On the contrary,
related to the present low level of financial intermediation the
financial sector is institutionally rather oversized if compared
to other countries. This may also explain partly the relatively
high gross spread charged by banks, which reflects high operating
costs. ^
Inflation and financial repression have largely contributed to
relatively high intermediation costs. Operating costs which re-
present over 70 per cent of total intermediation costs in Peru
contributed heavily to the large spread between average loan and
deposit rate which war- estimated by the World Bank at 13.3 per-
centage points in 1983 (World Bank, 1983, p. 70). This was far in
excess of estimates for the OECD countries (3 to 4 per cent), and
substantially above estimates for Turkey and Colombia (10 and 8.6
per cent), developing countries which have fairly high-cost fi-
nancial markets. Over the last years, the per unit operational
costs are likely to have increased even more in Peru, due to a
further shrinking of the relative size of the financial system
and to the increasingly short-term character of financial assets.
Such inefficiencies place a serious obstacle on the Peru's abili-
ty to mobilize financial resources and thus lower its growth
potential.
In addition, provision of subsidized credit lines by the Central
Reserve Bank to agriculture, housing, industry and mining has
The number of bank branches per 10 000 inhabitants is about
1.2, which is relatively high if compared with other developing
countries (Fischer, 1986, p. 94).- 19 -
lead to deficiencies in domestic lending. Since negative real
interest rates imply credit rationing these subsidized credit
lines have benefited only a few privileged social groups at the
expense of those with no access to credit from the formal finan-
cial sector. Finally, most probably the subsidized interest rates
on credits have favoured the use of capital intensive production
and hindered the absorption of abundant labor (Corsepius, 1986,
p. 180). Hence, there is little justification for such subsidies
on either social or economic grounds.
A very serious consequence of the directed credit schemes and the
resultant proliferation of financial institutions is the high
degree of market fragmentation. The operations of many of the
financial institutions are narrowly restricted while other in-
stitutions are inhibited by special sanctions to enter the mar-
ket. The result was lack of competition in many sub-markets and a
limitation on the inter-sectoral mobility of financial resources.
Financial market fragmentation is also related to the difficul-
ties of many firms, especially small and medium size enterprises,
to have access to credits from the banking system. The existence
of a large informal (financial) sector, where funds are made
available at higher interest rates, demonstrates not only the
difficulty to receive loans without real collaterals in the for-
mal sector but also that higher interest rates are not necessari-
ly a binding constraint for the realization of new investment
projects.
3. Recent Developments and Policy Changes
Three policy packages have been implemented since the Garcia
government came into office in July 1985. The first one (August
1985) was intended to break inflationary expectations and to
stimulate economic growth by intensifying protectionist measures,
lowering interest rates and freezing wages, the exchange rate and
prices after some initial adjustments. In October 1985 a second
policy package was introduced which was designed to reactivate
the economy. New expenditure programs were introduced, some taxes- 20 -
abolished, and additional tax exemptions were granted. The pack-
age also included a w;-,ge increase to private sector employees, an
interest free loan to all public sector employees, and a further
interest rate reduction. The expansionary fiscal policy was con-
tinued by the government with the announcement of the third poli-
cy package in February 1986 which also included measures to stop
the dollarization of the financial system. In order to stimulate
demand, the government increased the minimum wage, public sector
wages, and private sector wages not subject to collection bar-
gaining by between 25 per cent and 30 per cent. In addition,
public employment programs were to be expanded, the general sales
tax rate and interest rates (particularly those for agriculture)
were halved and the prices of diesel fuel were reduced to compen-
sate for the cost pressure in the economy created by salary in-
creases. Moreover, it was announced that the official exchange
rate would remain unchanged for "essential" inputs until the end
of 1986.
The major changes in financial policies since the Garcia govern-
ment took office are the following:
- the sol was replaced by a new currency, the inti, which equals
1000 soles.
- the convertibility of dollar denominated certificates of de-
posits was suspended and interest rates were reduced, making
such deposits less attractive. Depositors were only allowed to
convert the dollar deposits into local currency at the official
exchange rate. The repurchase of dollars was only possible at
the free market rate, which was considerably higher, so that a
significant loss was implied .
Furthermore, the frozen dollar certificates may be used for
payment of authorized imports through the Central Reserve Bank.
Since the dollar certificates are freely tradeable, this func-
tion gives them some degree of liquidity.- 21 -
interest charged by banks may not exceed an annual rate of
40 per cent. This ceiling was initially set at 110 per cent,
and was subsequently lowered to 75 per cent and 45 per cent,
before being set at its current level.
As a consequence of this strategy domestic production recovered
noticeably. In the second quarter of 1986 real gross domestic
product was 8.5 per cent higher than in the same period of 1985
(Table 6) . The expansionary stance of demand management is also
reflected by the increase of the monetary base at an annual rate
of 95 per cent during the first quarter of 1986. After the ini-
tial price increases for publicly marketed goods and services and
the subsequent price freeze, the monthly rate of inflation slowed
down from 11.8 per cent by mid-1985 to 2.8 per cent by the end of
1985, but it accelerated to 5.3 per cent (77 per cent on an an-
nual basis) during the first quarter of 1986 (Table 6). In July
1986 inflation is reported to have been 4.6 per cent per month.






























































































Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Peru.- 22 -
Although growth was initiated again, inflation has been reduced
markedly and the process of dollarization had been reversed this
was rather achieved through short-run interventions rather than
by a fundamental change of the economiy policy strategy. This is
also reflected by the results of the recent changes in financial
policies which could not reverse financial repression fundament-
ally. The change of the currency unit has not stopped the process
of demonetization. The shift from quasi-money to Ml that occurred
in the first half of 1986 rather indicates that deposits are
mainly held for transaction purposes and that the readiness to
accumulate savings into inti-deposits declined. While the basic
objective of the imposition of lower interest rate ceilings was
to reduce inflation through a reduction in (financial) costs its
more significant impact was on financial savings and demand of
credit. The lower interest rates yielded again strongly negative
returns of deposit holdings (Table A3) and thus could not provide
an incentive to save and at the same time stimulated the demand
of credit.
V. Policies to Improve Domestic Resource Mobilization
Given Peru's limited access to the international capital markets
raising the rate of domestic savings and effectively channeling
such savings into high-return investment can be seen as a key
strategy by which Peru could escape from its secular economic
stagnation.
Peru can improve its average savings rate substantially by rais-
ing the savings of the public sector. This could be achieved by
eliminating the current account deficit of the central government
Up to mid 1986 the share of foreign currency deposits in the
total liabilities of the financial system had decreased to 17
per cent.- 23 -
and substantially raising the current surplus of the public en-
terprises. These measures would not only improve the domestic
savings rate but also contribute to the overall stabilization of
the economy and increase the flow of investment funds to the
private sector. Private savings would be encouraged in a climate
of greater certainty, lower inflation and the elimination of
conditions leading to the flight of capital. Therefore all ef-
forts to stabilize the economy, to revitalize investments and
exports would be stimulative to higher private savings.
Whether higher private savings are used to finance additional
investments and growth critically depends on whether these funds
become available to the financial system and are efficiently
allocated to investment projects. Raising real interest rates on
inti deposits would certainly tend to stimulate private savings
through the banking system . The maintenance of negative real
interest rates on sol/inti accounts for extended periods has not
only discouraged the mobilization of domestic savings through the
banking system and accelerated the dollarization process but also
adversely influenced resource allocation and growth. In order to
achieve non-negative real rates of interest all efforts to reduce
the inflation rate would be the superior alternative to increas-
ing nominal rates of interest.
The ongoing process of dedollarization of the economy might be
seen as an important step to increase the funds for inti credits.
However, this goal can only satisfactorily be achieved without
unwarranted side effects if inti deposits are offered to the
public with attractive yields rather than by dismantling the
attractiveness of dollar deposits. Finally, if exchange rate
policies are not monitored to maintain Peru's international com-
This statement is well proven empirically. In reviewing empi-
rical studies in Asian countries strong support could be found
that financial savings react positively on a rise in real rates
of interest (see Corsepius, Fischer, 1986). For a discussion of
problems an interest liberalisation policy may be associated
with, see Corsepius (1986b).- 24 -
petitiveness the probability that dollars are deposited (illegal-
ly) abroad will increase and the domestic credit supply will
further shrink. The improvement of the functioning of the banking
system toward a more market-sensitive and transparent mechanism
of financial intermediation would foster the allocation of capi-
tal to high-return uses, augmenting Peru's industrial efficiency
and growth potential. Easier access to formal credits even at
higher interest rates would not only improve the overall effi-
ciency of investment projects but also lead to less activity in
the informal markets. Finally, easened access to credits would
provide an important incentive for savers to channel their sav-
ings through the banking system.
While financial institutions are heavily concentrated in Lima not
only the rural population but also poorer parts of the population
in urban areas are barely served by the banking system. Thus a
big mobilization potential could be tapped if savings instruments
tailored to the needs of small savers would be offered by the
existing financial institutions. This is especially true for
rural areas where - up to now - no serious mobilization efforts
have been undertaken, although the Agrarian Bank, for instance,
already operates in rural areas through a widespread network of
branches.
The creation of a more sophisticated capital market can only be
achieved in the long-run. The deepening of capital markets not
only requires a well functioning system of financial intermedia-
tion but also a more stable economic environment. However, pro-
mising steps towards this goal would be the establishment of a
more differentiated structure of interest rates in favour of
longer-term savings and credit instruments.- 25 -
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Table Al - Structure of Deposits and Other Liabilities of the Com-
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Table A2 - Real Per-Capita Income and the Ratio of Money (M2) to Gross Domestic Product

































































































































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1986, Washington; World





























































































































































































Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Peru; Own calculations.